Cardoso, Guilherme AraújoMiranda, Sérgio Ricardo Neves de2022-08-112022-08-112021CARDOSO, G. A.; MIRANDA, S. R. N. de. Should God believe the liar?: a non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s omniscience. Manuscrito, Campinas, v. 44, n. 4, p. 518-563, out./dez. 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/HKNmXqRQbJCzdGdyPY6tx6K/>. Acesso em: 24 maio 2022.2317-630Xhttp://www.repositorio.ufop.br/jspui/handle/123456789/15144In this paper, we discuss a family of arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the theistic God. We introduce three member of this family: Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue that the very simple dialetheist response to these paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own response based on a framework that we call Logic of Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism) or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful, omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism).en-USabertoParadoxesTruthSituation semanticsArtigo publicado em periodicoThis document is distributed under the terms of a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license (CC-BY-NC). Fonte: o PDF do artigo.https://doi.org/10.1590/0100-6045.2021.V44N4.GC