Should God believe the liar? : a non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s omniscience.
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Date
2021
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Abstract
In this paper, we discuss a family of
arguments that show the inconsistency of the concept of
omniscience, which is one of the central attributes of the
theistic God. We introduce three member of this family:
Grim’s Divine Liar Paradox, Milne’s Paradox and our own
Divine Curry. They can be seen as theological
counterparts of well-known semantic paradoxes. We argue
that the very simple dialetheist response to these
paradoxes doesn’t work well and then introduce our own
response based on a framework that we call Logic of
Impossible Truths (LIT). LIT is a non-dialetheist
paraconsistent logic designed to represent divine
ominiscience and to preserve the transparency of the truth
predicate and which semantics rests on the concept of
situation. Since some rules of classical logic are not valid
in LIT, we are in a position to block the derivation of the
paradoxes. Thus, LIT offers a way out of the dilemma of
accepting that there are true contradictions (dialetheism)
or giving up the idea that there is an all-powerful,
omniscient and perfectly good being (atheism).
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Keywords
Paradoxes, Truth, Situation semantics
Citation
CARDOSO, G. A.; MIRANDA, S. R. N. de. Should God believe the liar?: a non-dialetheist paraconsistent approach to God’s omniscience. Manuscrito, Campinas, v. 44, n. 4, p. 518-563, out./dez. 2021. Disponível em: <https://www.scielo.br/j/man/a/HKNmXqRQbJCzdGdyPY6tx6K/>. Acesso em: 24 maio 2022.